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Abstract
This article presents an empirical analysis of the effects of inclusionary zoning policies
on housing prices and starts in California during the period from 1988 through 2005.
The analysis compares cities with and without such policies and isolates the effects of
inclusionary zoning programs by carefully controlling for spatial and temporal conditions, such as the neighborhood or school district within which the house is located and
changing market conditions over time. The analysis found that inclusionary zoning
policies had measurable effects on housing markets in jurisdictions that adopt them;
specifically, the price of single-family houses increases and the size of single-family
houses decreases. The analysis also found that, although the cities with such programs
did not experience a significant reduction in the rate of single-family housing starts,
they did experience a marginally significant increase in multifamily housing starts.
The magnitude of this shift varied with the stringency of the inclusionary requirements.
Finally, the analysis found that the size of market-rate houses in cities that adopted
inclusionary zoning increased more slowly than in cities without such programs. The
results are fully consistent with economic theory and demonstrate that inclusionary
zoning policies do not come without costs.
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Introduction
As concerns about affordable housing have grown across the country, local governments have
responded by adopting a variety of affordable housing programs. An increasing number of local
governments are considering an inclusionary zoning approach, which requires developers to sell
a certain percentage of newly developed housing units at below-market rates to lower income
households. Although specific details of these programs vary widely, they are politically attractive
because they are viewed as a way to promote housing affordability without raising taxes or using
public funds.
No program, of course, is cost free. According to standard economic theory, inclusionary zoning
acts like a tax on housing construction. And just as with other taxes, the burdens of inclusionary
zoning are passed on to housing consumers, housing producers, and landowners. More specifically,
economic theory suggests that inclusionary zoning requirements act to decrease the supply of
housing at every price, raise housing prices, and slow housing construction. As a result, inclusionary
zoning policies could exacerbate the affordable housing problem that they are designed to address.
Although debate over the merits of inclusionary zoning has continued for nearly three decades,
no rigorous studies have been done on their effects on housing prices and starts. This article offers
such an analysis. Specifically, this article presents an analysis of the effects of inclusionary zoning
policies on single-family housing prices, single-family and multifamily housing starts, and the size
of single-family housing units in California during the period from 1988 through 2005.
The analysis found that inclusionary zoning policies have measurable effects on housing markets.
Specifically, it found that, in jurisdictions that adopt inclusionary zoning, the share of multifamily
housing increases, the price of single-family houses increases, and the size of single-family houses
decreases. The analysis did not examine the purported benefits of inclusionary zoning, such as
whether these policies increase the supply of affordable housing or serve to integrate low- and
high-income residents. Therefore, the analysis cannot ascertain whether inclusionary zoning increases
social welfare. It demonstrates, however, that such benefits do not come without measurable costs.

Background
The first inclusionary zoning program was adopted in 1974 by Montgomery County, Maryland.
The original Montgomery County ordinance required that 15 percent of new developments with
more than 50 housing units be sold at a price affordable to low-income households. In return, the
county provided developers with a density bonus that allowed them to build at a density up to 20
percent higher than the maximum density allowed by zoning. Since then, inclusionary zoning policies have grown in number and variety across the country. For example, between 1990 and 2003,
the number of California communities with inclusionary zoning grew from 29 to 107 (Powell and
Stringham, 2004). As of 2004, an estimated 350 to 400 local jurisdictions had inclusionary zoning
programs, with the vast majority of these programs enacted in California, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey (Porter, 2004).
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The economic effects of inclusionary zoning are similar to those of a tax on housing construction,
as show in exhibit 1. As more units are sold at a discount, the cost of development increases. Developers must raise the price on market-rate units to compensate for the cost of discounted units.
As a result, the price of market-rate housing rises and the production of such housing declines.
This decline in housing production can manifest as both a reduction in housing starts and as a
reduction in housing size.
The features of inclusionary zoning programs vary widely, as shown in exhibit 2. The economic
impacts of inclusionary zoning vary based on the different program features. A voluntary program
that relies on incentives might not have any economic impacts, while a mandatory program that
requires many, deep, and long-term discounts could have significant adverse economic effects.
Exhibit 1
The Economic Effects of Inclusionary Zoning
Price of Housing
Housing supply after tax
Housing supply before tax

Market price after tax
Market price before tax

Demand for housing

Housing
produced
after tax

Housing
produced
before tax

Quality of Housing

Exhibit 2
Distinguishing Features of Inclusionary Zoning Programs
Feature

IZ Programs

Size and types of
developments subject to
inclusionary requirements

Some programs are voluntary; others impose inclusionary requirements
only on large, single-family projects; and others impose inclusionary
requirements on all types of projects of all sizes.

Percent of units that must
be affordable

Some programs require only 5 percent of new units to be sold at a discount;
others require percentages as high as 30 percent.

Depth and duration of price The depth of price discounts often varies by the target population. For
discounts
example, many programs require that units be made affordable to those
at 80 percent of median household incomes, while others set different
standards. The period of affordability often varies from 10 to 99 years.
Incentives or allowances
offered in compensation

Most programs offer some form of incentives or compensation for providing
affordable units. Incentives and compensation often include density
bonuses, waivers of subdivision requirements, or fee reductions. Some
programs permit payments in lieu of inclusionary units.

IZ = inclusionary zoning.
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Previous research on inclusionary zoning has produced mixed results. Although most research has
been theoretical and dominated by case studies, some studies have sought to quantify the benefits
and potential costs.
An early study by Clapp (1981) described the potential reaction of developers to inclusionary zoning programs. Tombari (2005) similarly described the potential adverse effects on housing prices
and starts. Powell and Stringham (2004), in their study for the Reason Public Policy Institute,
provided quantitative support for the concerns raised by Clapp and Tombari. Specifically, using
data from the San Francisco Bay area, they provided evidence to suggest that inclusionary zoning
makes market-priced homes more expensive, restricts the supply of new homes, and produces few
affordable units.
A considerable volume of case study research, however, comes to quite opposite conclusions.
Using data from Los Angeles, Rosen (2002) found no correlation between the adoption of an
inclusionary housing policy and housing starts in 28 California cities. Multiple case studies by
Calavita (Calavita, 2004; Calavita and Grimes, 1998; Calavita, Grimes, and Mallach, 1997) and
his colleagues in California and New Jersey concluded that inclusionary zoning is a viable strategy
for increasing the supply of affordable housing and mixing low- and high-income residents. The
National Housing Conference (2002) drew similar conclusions in case studies conducted in Massachusetts.
In a study of the inclusionary zoning programs in the Greater Washington metropolitan area,
Brown (2001) concluded that inclusionary zoning programs work best in jurisdictions with large
amounts of undeveloped land and less effectively in dense, more mature metropolitan areas. The
Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California (NPH) and the California Coalition for
Rural Housing (2003) published the results of a survey on the prevalence and components of
inclusionary housing programs in California. The study found significant variation in both the
prevalence and the components of the programs in California and concluded that the effects of
such programs depend in part on such programmatic details. The study presented in the following
section tests this proposition using data from the NPH survey.

Scope and Context of the Study
This article examines housing markets in local jurisdictions in California during the period from
1988 through 2005. During this period, for a number of reasons, California offers a good setting
for examining the effects of inclusionary zoning. First, the state is large and includes many municipalities with distinct regulatory environments. Second, California is an often-studied state with
very good data available for housing market analysis. Third, and most importantly, inclusionary
zoning programs became increasingly common in California during the study period. Time-series
analyses of housing markets in California from 1988 through 2005 included observations of many
cities with existing inclusionary zoning policies, cities without inclusionary zoning policies, and
cities that adopted inclusionary zoning policies within the study period. For each individual city in
this sample we controlled for unobserved, time-invariant characteristics that might affect housing
starts or the types of houses that are built. By doing so, we were able to isolate the effects of the
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inclusionary zoning programs, relative to other factors that might be influencing new housing
developments. It is the variation in the use of inclusionary zoning across the state and over time
that helps to isolate the effects of this policy from other factors.
Although the study setting is well suited for this analysis, any such analysis must be interpreted
in the context of prevailing market conditions. As shown in exhibits 3 and 4, housing starts in
California were strongly influenced by national business cycles during the study period. Housing
starts bottomed in the early 1990s as the national economy fell into recession but increased fairly
consistently as the economy recovered. New housing prices were similarly affected by national
business cycles, as shown in exhibit 5 for the San Francisco and Sacramento metropolitan areas,
but did not rise until 1996. The average size of a new, single-family house, however, rose slowly
but consistently during the study period, as shown in exhibit 5.
Although these trends primarily reflect national business cycles, housing markets in California
have several location-specific characteristics of note. According to Landis et al. (2000), since the
1980s, housing markets in California have not produced housing units commensurate with the
rapid growth in demand. The specific reasons for this are numerous, although limitations in the
supply of land, capital, and infrastructure are all likely factors. Regulatory constraints probably also
played a role. According to Pendall, Puente, and Martin (2006), local governments in California
have adopted more growth management instruments than their counterparts in other parts of the
country. Thus, it is important to note that this study was conducted in markets characterized by
strong demand-side pressures and significant and varied supply-side constraints.
Exhibit 3
New Housing Construction for All Cities in California
35,000
Multifamily units

Single-family units

Total units

30,000

Number of units

25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year
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Exhibit 4
New Housing Construction for Cities in California With Inclusionary Zoning
180,000
160,000

Single-family units

Multifamily units

Total units

140,000

Number of units

120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year

Exhibit 5
Square Footage and New House Prices in the San Francisco and Sacramento
Metropolitan Areas
$400,000

2,500
Square footage

2,400

New house price
$350,000

2,300

$300,000

2,100
2,000

$250,000

1,900
1,800
1,700

$200,000

1,600
1,500

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year
a

In 1988 dollars.
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Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data for this analysis, derived from a variety of sources, are used to compile two distinct data
sets. The primary sources of these data include the California Construction Industry Research Board
(CIRB), the Census Bureau, and DataQuick News Service Custom Reports. (Appendix A presents
details of the data.) The first data set uses municipalities as the unit of analysis and includes
information about the physical, demographic, and economic characteristics of cities throughout
California, including information on location, regulatory environment, and natural setting. In addition, the data set includes information about whether the municipality had an inclusionary zoning
program and, if so, when the program was first adopted. Data were obtained for the period 1988
through 2005. This first data set is used to study the effects of inclusionary zoning on the number
and composition (single family vs. multifamily) of housing units built, controlling for other factors.
As shown in exhibit 6, 65 municipalities included in this study had adopted an inclusionary zoning
program after 1989 but before the end of the study period. On average, the minimum project size
at which a development became subject to inclusionary requirements was 12 housing units and
the percentage of units that had to be made available to low-income households was 12 percent.
Of the 65 municipalities with inclusionary policies, 57 percent allowed offsite allowances, 76 percent
allowed in-lieu fees, 25 percent offered land dedication allowances, and 13 percent allowed developer
credit transfers. The average length of time affordable units must remain affordable is 34 years,
although many municipalities have stipulated that the units remain affordable in perpetuity.
As illustrated in exhibit 7, cities that adopted inclusionary programs are located throughout the
state but are most common in the coastal areas, especially in the San Francisco and Sacramento
metropolitan areas and the Los Angeles metropolitan area. In general, municipalities that had
inclusionary zoning programs, relative to those that did not, had higher incomes, higher housing
Exhibit 6
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Offsite allowances
In-lieu fees
Land dedications
Developer credit transfers
Target population very low income
Target population low income
Target population moderate income
Period of affordabilitya
Minimum project size to qualifyb
Percent of units as part of IZ
Cities (N)
Observationsc

Inclusionary Zoning Cities
Mean

Sd

57%
76%
25%
13%
41%
77%
61%
34
12
12%

50%
43%
43%
34%
49%
42%
49%
12
50
6%

Min.

Max.

10
0
0%

55
400
30%

65
1,011

IZ = inclusionary zoning. N = number. Sd = standard deviation.
a
In years.
b
Number of units.
c
Years of data * N.
Note: The study included 65 municipalities.
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Exhibit 7
Inclusionary Zoning Programs in California

IZ = inclusionary zoning.
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prices, higher growth rates, and more neighbors with similar policies. In addition, these municipalities were closer to the coast.
The second data set uses new single-family home sales as the unit of analysis. This data set
includes information about newly constructed housing units in the San Francisco and Sacramento
metropolitan areas, and it includes the physical features of the house, the neighborhood in which
the house is located, and the policies of the pertinent governmental jurisdiction—including the
features of any applicable inclusionary zoning programs. The second data set was used to estimate
the impacts of inclusionary zoning on the price and size of new homes sold.
Descriptive statistics of the new homes sold from 1988 through 2005 in the San Francisco and
Sacramento metropolitan areas are presented in exhibit 8. The costs and size changes, mirrored in
exhibit 5, indicate the recession of the early 1990s and the upward trend toward larger homes. The
mean price of new home sales, even after correcting for inflation, increased steadily after 1995.
Exhibit 8
Descriptive Statistics—San Francisco and Sacramento Metropolitan Areas New
Home Sales
Year

Number

Mean Costa
($)

Mean Number
of Bathrooms

Mean Number
of Bedrooms

Mean Floor
Spaceb

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

14,580
21,165
18,694
12,526
11,158
8,022
13,189
11,718
13,813
15,482
15,768
17,834
17,977
18,967
21,954
20,773
21,827
23,268

167.68
161.31
180.66
185.27
176.67
170.02
167.12
170.87
175.26
188.78
195.86
213.63
233.04
230.40
235.82
259.16
304.15
354.67

2.31
2.36
2.42
2.41
2.36
2.38
2.39
2.42
2.43
2.48
2.49
2.55
2.61
2.64
2.60
2.63
2.68
2.67

3.07
3.22
3.35
3.28
3.24
3.30
3.35
3.39
3.37
3.47
3.49
3.57
3.62
3.67
3.58
3.58
3.61
3.50

1.74
1.81
1.90
1.89
1.83
1.83
1.85
1.88
1.91
2.00
2.06
2.17
2.30
2.35
2.34
2.39
2.41
2.37

Avg.

16,595

209.46

2.49

3.43

2.06

Thousands of dollars in 1988 dollars.
b
Thousands of square feet.
a

Methods
To explore the effects of inclusionary zoning, we conducted a multivariate statistical analysis of
housing starts, prices, and size. The results are presented in exhibits 9 through 12. Exhibits 9 and
10 present the stock and composition effects of inclusionary zoning on housing starts. Exhibit 11
presents the effects of inclusionary zoning on housing prices. Exhibit 12 presents the results of the
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analysis on housing size. Each analysis includes city-level “fixed” effects to capture market-specific
differences between jurisdictions that are assumed constant over time.
This analysis of housing starts specified the dependent variable as the percentage change in housing units so that the coefficients could be interpreted as elasticities—that is, the percentage change
in starts resulting from a percentage (or unit) change in the dependent variable. Controls included
city and year fixed effects that allowed us to account for any unobserved city-level characteristics
(such as proximity to the coast, elevation, or desirable amenities) and for characteristics that are
uniform across cities but vary across time (such as changing market conditions or statewide recessionary periods).
The analysis of housing prices specified the dependent variable as the logarithm of the sales price,
and the analysis of house size specified the dependent variable in 1,000 square feet of living space.1
As with the housing starts models, we controlled for unobserved spatial and temporal characteristics of the houses that might affect their prices. Specifically, we controlled for the year and quarter
the home was sold and for the neighborhood and school district within which the house is located.
These controls allowed us to carefully account for any outside factors that may have influenced
housing prices, thus isolating the effects of the inclusionary zoning programs.

Results
In this section, we present the key results of this study. We focus on effects on housing starts,
composition of housing starts, prices of new homes sold, and the size of new homes sold.

Effects on Housing Starts
As column 1 of exhibit 9 shows, our findings indicate that inclusionary zoning programs had a
small and insignificant effect on total housing starts during the study period. The analysis suggests
that housing starts in municipalities were 0.15 percent greater in municipalities with an inclusionary zoning program compared to those without. This estimate, however, is not statistically
significant at the 90-percent confidence level.
As column 2 of exhibit 9 shows, our findings indicate that inclusionary zoning programs had a
small and statistically insignificant effect on single-family housing starts. The analysis suggests that
single-family housing starts were 0.19 percent lower in municipalities that had an inclusionary
zoning program compared with those that did not. This estimate, however, also is not statistically
significant at the 90-percent confidence level.
As column 3 of exhibit 9 shows, our findings indicate that inclusionary zoning programs had
a small and statistically insignificant positive effect on multifamily housing starts. The estimate
indicates that multifamily housing starts were 0.36 percent higher in municipalities that had an

1
To capture the potential endogeneity of the inclusionary zoning variable, we included a 1-year lag of the dependent
variable in the regression. Although lagging the dependent variable is not the ideal instrument for treating endogeneity, we
had no better variables that should be correlated with the inclusionary zoning variable and not with the dependent variable.
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Exhibit 9
New Housing Stock Change Models
Model
Dependent Variable:
([HUt+1 - HUt] / HUt)(*100)
Inclusionary zoning program
[HUt - HUt-1]

(1)

(2)

(3)

Total
Housing Units

Single-Family
Housing Units

Multifamily
Housing Units

0.1536
(0.1478)
1.03e-05
(2.22e-06)***

– 0.1885
(0.1918)
4.32e-05
(4.00e-06)***

Observations
City fixed effects
Year controls
R-squared

5,509
Yes
Yes
0.07

5,509
Yes
Yes
0.14

0.3601
(0.2605)
3.93e-06
(1.71e-06)**
5,509
Yes
Yes
0.01

HU = housing units.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

inclusionary zoning program compared with those that did not. Once again, however, this estimate
is not statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level.

Effects on Composition of Housing Starts
As column 1 of exhibit 10 shows, our estimates indicate that the adoption of inclusionary zoning
had a significant effect on the share of single-family housing starts. Holding all other variables
constant, the share of single-family housing starts in municipalities that implemented inclusionary
zoning programs was nearly 7 percentage points lower than the share in those municipalities that
did not implement such a program. This result is very significant: the chances are less than 0.01
percent that there was no effect of inclusionary zoning on this ratio of housing mix.
As columns 2 and 3 of exhibit 10, respectively, show, the effect of inclusionary zoning on housing
mix varied significantly with the percentage of housing units required to be sold to low-income
households and with the minimum project size subject to inclusionary zoning requirements. Compared with jurisdictions without inclusionary zoning programs, municipalities with an inclusionary
zoning program in which the percentage of new homes to be sold at a discount requirement was
more severe (greater than 10 percent of a project’s units) experienced a 12-percent shift from
single-family to multifamily housing starts. Similarly, the inclusionary zoning regulation resulted
in a 10-percent shift from single-family to multifamily housing starts in jurisdictions with an
inclusionary zoning program in which the threshold that required participation in the inclusionary
zoning program was more severe (for example, inclusionary zoning regulations that apply only to
projects with fewer than 10 units).
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Exhibit 10
New Housing Composition Change Models
Dependent Variable:
% Single-Family Unitst+1 (*100)
Inclusionary zoning program

(1)

(2)

(3)

– 6.8868
(1.9365)***

Inclusionary zoning program requiring 10% or
less of the units for low-income households

– 2.9150
(2.5151)

Inclusionary zoning program requiring more than
10% of the units for low-income households

– 12.1033
(2.8076)***

Inclusionary zoning program and a threshold of
less than 10 units

– 9.6961
(2.1297)***

Inclusionary zoning program and a threshold of
10 or more units

– 0.9995
(3.7497)

Percent of single-family unitst
Observations
City fixed effects
Year controls
R-squared

0.0671
(0.0173)***

0.0664
(0.01734)***

0.0663
(0.01734)***

5,880
Yes
Yes
0.03

5,880
Yes
Yes
0.03

5,880
Yes
Yes
0.03

* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Effects on Prices of New Homes Sold
Estimates of the effects of inclusionary zoning programs on housing prices are presented in exhibit 11. As
column 1 shows, our estimates indicate that inclusionary zoning programs raise housing prices by
approximately 2.2 percent. Also, as columns 2 and 3 show, our estimates indicate that the effects
on inclusionary zoning are greater in higher priced housing markets. Specifically, our estimates
indicate that inclusionary zoning programs lowered the price of housing that sold for less than
$187,0002 (in 1988 dollars) by about 0.8 percent and increased the price of housing that sold for
more than $187,000 by about 5.0 percent.

Effects on the Size of New Homes Sold
Estimates of the effects of inclusionary zoning on the size of single-family housing are presented in
exhibit 12. As column 1 shows, our estimates indicate that the implementation of an inclusionary
zoning program lowers the mean housing size by approximately 48 square feet. Further, as columns 2
and 3 show, the effects of inclusionary zoning on housing size are greater on lower priced homes.
Specifically, our estimates indicate that houses that sold for less than $187,000 are approximately
33 square feet smaller in inclusionary zoning jurisdictions, while houses that sold for more than
$187,000 are larger in inclusionary zoning jurisdictions by a statistically insignificant amount.
2
Using the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s house price index for California, this amount is equivalent to $657,090 in
2007 dollars.
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Exhibit 11
The Effect of Inclusionary Zoning on New Housing Values
Dependent Variable: Cost in 1988 Dollars
House price samplea
Inclusionary zoning program
Observations
Beds, baths, and floor space included
Census block group boundary fixed effects
Year of sale controls
Quarter of sale controls
School district boundary controls
Lot size controls
Dummies for missing data
Clustered errors at the block group level
R-squared (within)

(1)

(2)
All

0.022
(0.003)***

< $187,000
– 0.008
(0.004)***

(3)
> $187,000
0.050
(0.003)***

298,715

149,253

149,462

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

0.60

0.31

0.58

In 1988 dollars.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Sample includes all Bay Area and Sacramento new house sales of homes
with fewer than 12 bedrooms or bathrooms, less than 30,000 square feet of living space, and more than 250 square feet of
living space and that cost more than $20,000.
a

Exhibit 12
The Effect of Inclusionary Zoning on Square Footage of New Houses
Dependent Variable: New House Interior
Square Footage (Floor Space)/1,000
House price samplea
Inclusionary zoning program
Observations
Beds and baths included
Census block group boundary fixed effects
Year of sale controls
Quarter of sale controls
School district boundary controls
Lot size controls
Dummies for missing data
Clustered errors at the block group level
R-squared (within)

(1)
All
– 0.048
(0.006)***

(2)
< $187,000
– 0.033
(0.007)***

(3)
> $187,000
0.001
(0.008)

298,715

149,253

149,462

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

0.53

0.52

0.46

In 1988 dollars.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Sample includes all Bay Area and Sacramento new house sales of homes
with fewer than 12 bedrooms or bathrooms, less than 30,000 square feet of living space, and more than 250 square feet of
living space and that cost more than $20,000.
a
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Conclusions
Although inclusionary zoning programs have been around for some time, they remain controversial.
Proponents argue that such programs are effective tools for increasing the supply of affordable housing
and for helping to integrate low- and high-income residents. Opponents argue that such programs
impose cost burdens on developers, increase the price of market-rate units, and lower the supply
of market-rate housing. This study provides no new information about the validity of the arguments
of the proponents; however, it does offer new information about the arguments of the opponents.
Overall, our findings show that inclusionary zoning programs had significant effects on housing
markets in California from 1988 through 2005. Although cities with existing or new programs
during the study period did not experience a significant reduction in the rate of single-family housing starts, they did experience a statistically insignificant increase (at a 90-percent confidence level)
in multifamily housing starts. As a consequence, our findings show that cities with inclusionary
housing programs experienced a significant and relatively large increase in the ratio of multifamily
to single-family housing production. That is, having an inclusionary housing program increased a
city’s multifamily housing starts share by 7 percent. The reasons for this shift are relatively clear.
Housing markets in California cities, persistently constrained by regulatory barriers, expanded
rapidly during the 1990s as the national and California economies recovered from the 1991 recession. Inclusionary zoning programs in cities where they were adopted placed a small additional
burden on single-family development and less of a burden on multifamily development. Under the
pressure of growing demand, single-family starts declined slightly and multifamily starts increased
significantly. The economic recovery, paired with a more rigid regulatory environment, caused a
significant shift toward multifamily housing development during the 1990s. This shift was greater
in cities that required a larger percentage of the new units to be sold at below-market rates and
in cities that required inclusionary units in developments with smaller numbers of units. No net
effect, however, was evident on total housing starts.
Findings also indicate that housing prices in cities that adopted inclusionary zoning increased
approximately 2 to 3 percent faster than in cities that did not adopt such policies. In addition, our
findings show that housing price effects were greater in higher priced housing markets than in
lower priced markets. That is, housing that sold for less than $187,000 (in 1988 dollars) decreased
by only 0.8 percent, but housing that sold for more than $187,000 increased by 5.0 percent. These
findings suggest that housing producers, in general, did not respond to inclusionary requirements
by slowing the rate of construction of single-family housing but did pass the increase in production costs on to housing consumers. Further, housing producers were better able to pass on the
increase in costs in higher priced housing markets than in lower priced housing markets.
Finally, our findings indicate that the size of market-rate houses in cities that adopted inclusionary
zoning increased more slowly than in cities without such programs. Specifically, our findings show
that housing size in cities with inclusionary zoning programs was approximately 48 square feet
smaller than in cities without inclusionary programs. Further, most of the reductions in housing
size occurred in houses that sold for less than $187,000. These findings suggest that inclusionary
zoning programs caused housing producers to increase the price of more expensive homes in
markets in which residents were less sensitive to price and to decrease the size of less expensive
homes in markets in which residents were more sensitive to price.
20 Regulatory Innovation and Affordable Housing
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Once again, these results must be understood in context. The California housing market expanded
rapidly over the 1990s as pent-up demand exploded following the 1991 recession. The imposition
of inclusionary zoning requirements was not strong enough to slow the overall rate of housing
production but did cause a measurable shift from single-family to multifamily housing production.
The magnitude of this shift varied with the stringency of the inclusionary requirements. The imposition of inclusionary requirements was strong enough, however, to cause a rise in housing prices
and a reduction in housing size. Price effects were larger in high-priced markets, and size effects
were larger in low-priced markets.
These results are fully consistent with economic theory and demonstrate that inclusionary zoning
policies do not come without cost. In robust housing markets, such as those of California during
the 1990s, inclusionary zoning requirements were not strong enough to slow the rate of housing
production, although they did cause housing prices to rise and housing size to fall. In less robust
markets, it is more likely that inclusionary requirements have stronger effects on housing starts
than on housing prices and size. Confirmation of such speculation, however, is beyond the scope
of this study.

Appendix A
The data set used for this analysis has four main components: (1) California housing construction
data—measures of housing construction in California’s cities from 1988 through 2005; (2) cityspecific housing attributes—data relating to the physical, demographic, and economic characteristics
of California’s cities; (3) inclusionary zoning data—city-specific data relating to the inclusionary
zoning regulations that have been implemented in California’s cities; and (4) Consumer Price
Index (CPI) data.

California Housing Construction Data
This section provides details on the data that were used to construct the stock and composition of
housing in California as well as the data that were used to analyze new housing construction in the
San Francisco and Sacramento metropolitan areas.

Changes in Housing Stock and Composition
The California Construction Industry Research Board (CIRB) provided aggregate house construction
data. The data include total new residential building permit counts, by number of units, for all cities
in the 58 California counties from 1988 through 2005. CIRB provided the building classification, in
which the new residential building permits were divided into two groups: (1) single-family housing,
which includes detached, semidetached, rowhouse, and townhouse units; and (2) multifamily
housing, which includes duplexes, three- to four-unit structures, and apartment-type structures
with five units or more.3
Rowhouses and townhouses are included as single-family housing when each unit is separated from the adjacent unit by
an unbroken ground-to-roof wall or firewall. Condominiums are included as single-family housing when they are of zerolot-line or zero-property-line construction; when units are separated by an air space; or, when units are separated by an
unbroken ground-to-roof or firewall. Multifamily housing also includes condominium units in structures of more than one
living unit that do not meet the single-family housing definition above.
3
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The data detailing the existing housing stock in each city were collected from the Census Bureau
for the 1990 census year. These estimates include a measure of the number of single-family houses
and multifamily houses in each city in 1990. The intra-annual housing stock totals for the 1991–2005
housing years were calculated by adding the 1990 Census housing stock to the number of homes
constructed in the previous year.4 These estimates were calculated for single-family and multifamily
units and for the total number of housing units.

New House Construction in the San Francisco and Sacramento Metropolitan Areas
Individual new house sales data were collected from DataQuick News Service Custom Reports. The
initial data set received from DataQuick included 415,303 observations, covering all new house sales
in the San Francisco and Sacramento metropolitan areas for the 1988-through-2005 timeframe.
Specifically, the data include new single-family and multifamily housing sales in 11 counties in the
San Francisco area (Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Monterey, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo,
Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, and Sonoma Counties) and 8 counties in the Sacramento area
(Butte, El Dorado, Fresno, Nevada, Placer, Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Stanislaus Counties).
Unfortunately, a number of observations in the initial data set were missing house characteristics
data.5 Of the initial data provided by DataQuick, approximately 298,715 observations were of a
quality that they could be used in the hedonic estimation. Of the 298,715 observations, each sale
included the following data: the parcel number of the house; the date of sale (day, month, and
year); the price of sale; the city, ZIP Code, and latitude/longitude of the house; and the lot size,
number of bathrooms, number of bedrooms, and square footage of the house.

City-Specific Housing Attributes
This section provides details on the geography and census data associated with each individual
city in the data set as well as the school district boundary data associated with each individual new
house sold in the San Francisco and Sacramento metropolitan areas.

Geographic Characteristics of the Data
The process for creating the data set used four different levels of geography from the U.S. census:
census block group, ZIP Code, city, and county. The census geographic files were provided in a
geographic projection as ArcView Geographic Information System (GIS) Cartographic Boundary
Files and were normalized to the 2000 geography by GeoLytics, Inc.
The main unit of measurement in the analysis of the supply of housing is the consolidated city. A
total of 468 cities were reported in the year 2005, 4 of which (Aliso Viejo, Elk Grove, Goleta, and

4

Therefore, the housing stock in year t is represented by:

where HS is the total housing

stock in year t, and HG is the number of homes built in year t. This process assumes that there is no loss in the existing
housing stock and that the new housing stock is not a replacement of the old stock.
5
Of the initial 415,303 observations received from DataQuick, 5,679 were missing sales price information; 98,805 were
missing bed, bath, and square-footage information; and 67,788 were missing latitude and longitude information. (Note
that some of the observations listed above overlap in terms of omitted information.) An additional 438 observations with
latitude and longitude information were located outside the San Francisco and Sacramento areas.
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Rancho Cordova) do not match with the census geographies because they were incorporated after
the year 2000.
The ArcView GIS consolidated city shapefiles were used with a GIS line shapefile that was constructed to represent the California coast. The shortest distance (in kilometers) from the centroid
of each city to the coast was then calculated using ArcView GIS, with a range from a maximum of
312 km (the city of Needles, in San Bernardino County) to less than a few hundred meters.

Census Data
The demographic variables in the analysis come from GeoLytics’ provision of the 1990 Census
long form files and include “places” data (cities, towns, and incorporated places that have legally
prescribed boundaries, powers, and functions) for the cities and towns in California. The data
include the following:
1. Total population.
2. Total land area.
3. Ethnicity (percent White, Hispanic, Black, Asian, and other for each city).
4. Per capita income.
5. Household income.
6. Total housing units.
7. Percent vacant housing units.
8. Percent owner-occupied housing units.
9. Percent single-family detached housing units.
10. Median year of construction for all housing units.
The total population and total land area variables were used to construct a population density
value for each city. This variable is measured as the total population of the city divided by the total
land area of the city in square kilometers.

School District Boundaries
In California, a student’s “home school district,” be it elementary or secondary, is assigned by
virtue of the residential location. More often than not, a student will attend the nearest school in
the district, but this is not uniformly true. Any student can attend any school within the district,
as long as space is available; likewise, a student may petition to attend a school outside the district,
again dependent on available space. For this reason, the 1:1 assignment of a school to a student
without information on that assignment was impossible to create.
The analysis, however, controlled for the different school district boundaries. In the individual
house sales model, each observation was spatially matched to its respective elementary and secondary school district. Cartographic boundary files of the school districts, as defined in the year 2000,
were collected from the Census Bureau.
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Inclusionary Zoning Data
City-level data on inclusionary zoning regulations were taken from the Inclusionary Housing in
California: 30 Years of Innovation study (2003), conducted by the California Coalition for Rural
Housing and the Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California, during 2002 and early
2003. The survey includes detailed information about how local inclusionary zoning programs are
structured.6 The data collected from the survey include the following:
1. The year the inclusionary zoning policy was adopted.
2. The minimum project size.
3. The percentage of units required.
4. The targeted income group (very low, low, middle income).
5. Alternatives to construction (offsite allowances, in-lieu fees, land dedication allowances, and
developer credit transfers).
6. The length of affordability.
Missing information from the survey was collected through personal contact with those cities or
counties that did not respond to the survey or was taken from the Reason Public Policy Institute’s
“Housing Supply and Affordability: Do Affordable Housing Mandates Work?” (The list of unresponsive cities includes Fairfax, Los Gatos, Port Hueneme, Del Mar, Gonzales, Long Beach, Morro Bay,
Vista, Woodland, and Menlo Park.)

Consumer Price Index Data
Consumer Price Index data were used to normalize the house sales price to a base year of 1988.
The CPI statistics were provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The annual average CPI was calculated for all urban consumers, using all consumable items, for
residents of the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose Metropolitan Statistical Area in California, using a
base year of 1988. These data are publicly available from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of
Labor Statistics under series IDs (CUURA422SA0) and (CUUSA422SA0).7
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used, with a maximum difference of +7.1 percent and a minimum difference of -2.3 percent, depending on the year. Our
model results are robust to the type of CPI used, but the Akaike information criterion goodness-of-fit test prefers the San
Francisco-Oakland-San Jose CPI for the normalization method.
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